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Abstract: This chapter focuses on the extent to which public health has been relied upon by 
the EU legislature or by Member States of the European Union to limit the freedom of 
commercial operators to promote their goods and services. First, it discusses why courts in 
the United States and in Europe have ruled that the freedom of commercial operators to 
advertise their goods and services should be protected, in light of the fundamental role 
advertising plays in a liberal market economy. It shows that freedom of commercial 
expression has been made conditional upon the disclosure of sufficient and reliable 
information to consumers, thus reflecting a model of consumer protection based on the well-
informed and reasonably circumspect consumer. Secondly, it addresses the more 
controversial question of the extent to which public health may be invoked as an overriding 
requirement of public interest to curtail the right of commercial operators to promote their 
goods and services. The approach of the Court of Justice is compared with that taken by the 
US Supreme Court. This comparative approach highlights the differences between the two: 
the former is very reluctant to exercise its review powers, while the latter has made it 
excessively difficult for public authorities to impose any meaningful advertising restrictions. It 
is argued that neither court has been able to strike a suitable balance between, one the one 
hand, the need to review the validity of restrictions imposed by public authorities on 
commercial speech to ensure a high level of public health protection and, one the other hand, 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is a revised version of a seminar paper given in Cambridge on 11 November 2009. I am most 
grateful to the Centre of European Legal Studies for their kind invitation. I am also indebted to Catherine 
Barnard for her comments on an earlier draft. 
the need to ensure that courts do not substitute their assessment to that of the legislature in 
exercising their judicial review powers. A more balanced approach is required to ensure the 
adequate protection of consumer health. 
I. Introduction 
 
Freedom of expression is protected by several national constitutions and a range of 
international law instruments.
1
 The notion of expression is broad, and the question of whether 
commercial expression should be protected at all and, if so, at what level has sparked lively 
controversies, particularly in the United States of America. Nevertheless, the question of 
protection of commercial expression has yet to be resolved satisfactorily.  
One of the public interest reasons put forward to limit the freedom of commercial 
operators to advertise their goods and services is public health. Certain goods and services, 
such as illicit drugs, may be so dangerous that they are not allowed on the market and cannot, 
as such, be lawfully advertised. Beyond these products and services, the marketing of which 
does not benefit from constitutional protection at all, there are others the consumption of 
which is not recommended but which are not deemed sufficiently harmful to be banned from 
the market altogether. They include, most notably: tobacco, alcohol, medicines and medicinal 
treatments, unhealthy food and gambling services. Growing evidence that advertising and 
other forms of promotion do impact on lifestyle choices supports the argument that public 
authorities have an interest in regulating the advertising of such goods and services in the 
name of public health protection. 
This chapter focuses on the extent to which public health has been relied upon by the EU 
legislature or by Member States of the European Union to limit the freedom of commercial 
                                                 
1
 Relevant texts include (but are not limited to): the First Amendment to the US Constitution; § 2 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; Art 5 of the German Constitution; Art 11 of the French Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; Arts 14 and 54 of the Polish Constitution; Art 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Art 11 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights; Art 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Art 4 
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; Art 9 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights; and Art 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
operators to promote their goods and services. First, it discusses why courts in the United 
States and in Europe have ruled that the freedom of commercial operators to advertise their 
goods and services should be protected, in light of the fundamental role advertising plays in a 
liberal market economy. It shows that freedom of commercial expression has been made 
conditional upon the disclosure of sufficient and reliable information to consumers, thus 
reflecting a model of consumer protection based on the well-informed and reasonably 
circumspect consumer (section II.). Secondly, it addresses the more controversial question of 
the extent to which public health may be invoked as an overriding requirement of public 
interest to curtail the right of commercial operators to promote their goods and services. It 
focuses on how European Union institutions, and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
more specifically, have attempted to reconcile potentially competing interests. The approach 
is comparative, drawing on the case law of the US Supreme Court. As there is a significant 
body of legislation and case law relating to tobacco advertising, this example is used to 
illustrate the argument, even though the scope of application of the argument is much broader 
and it applies to other products and to services whose excessive consumption is detrimental to 
health (section III.).
2
 This chapter argues that neither the Court of Justice of the European 
Union nor the US Supreme Court has struck a suitable balance between, one the one hand, the 
need to review the validity of restrictions imposed by public authorities on commercial speech 
to ensure a high level of public health protection and, one the other hand, the need to ensure 
that courts do not substitute their assessment for that of the legislature in exercising their 
judicial review powers. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 This chapter does not discuss the boundaries between commercial and other kinds of speech (and in particular 
mixed speech). It focuses exclusively on advertising and similar forms of promotion: a pure form of commercial 
speech. On this question, which has given rise to an extensive body of case law and legal writings, particularly in 
the US, see, among others: R Shiner, Freedom of Commercial Expression (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2003); E Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 392–416; C Munro, 
‗The Value of Commercial Speech‘ (2003) 62 CLJ 134; M Hertig Randall, ‗Commercial Speech Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Subordinate or Equal?‘ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 53; J 
Krzeminska-Vamvaka, Freedom of Commercial Speech in Europe (Hamburg, Verlag Dr Kovac, 2008). 
II. The Information Paradigm as a Justification for the 
Constitutional Protection of the Freedom of Commercial Expression 
 
The First Amendment to the US Constitution protects freedom of expression: ‗Congress shall 
make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press …‘. It nonetheless leaves the 
notion of 'expression' undefined. The question has therefore arisen of whether commercial 
expression, and advertising more specifically, falls within its scope. This question does not 
suggest an obvious answer, as the evolution of the case law of the US Supreme Court 
illustrates. 
In the Valentine v Christensen case, which involved the validity of a New York ordinance 
banning the distribution of advertisements in the streets, the Supreme Court ruled that 
commercial free speech did not fall within the realm of protection of the First Amendment to 
the US Constitution:  
[T]he Constitution imposes no restraint on government as respects purely commercial 
advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in 
the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of 
user, are matters for legislative judgment.3 
 
Nevertheless, after a series of decisions tempering this statement,
4
 the Supreme Court 
reversed its position in its landmark Virginia State Board of Pharmacy judgment.
5
 In this 
case, consumers of prescription drugs sued the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and its 
individual members, challenging the validity of a Virginia statute declaring it unprofessional 
conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs. The US 
Supreme Court upheld the complaint and ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment. 
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Blackmun J stated: 
 
                                                 
3
 Valentine v Chrestensen (1942) 316 US 52, 54. 
4
 See, in particular New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254 and Bigelow v Virginia (1975) 421 US 809. 
5
 Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Consumer Council (1976) 425 US 748. 
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is so removed from ‗any exposition of ideas‘ and from ‗truth, science, morality, and arts in 
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, that it lacks 
all protection. Our answer is that it is not …6 
 
 What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of 
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information‘s 
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions, we concluded that 
the answer to this one is in the negative.
7
 
 
Two points emerge from these statements, which still provide the basis of the US Supreme 
Court‘s case law: the first one refers to the rationale for extending the protection of the First 
Amendment to commercial speech (A.), while the second refers to the condition laid down by 
the US Supreme Court that speech benefits from constitutional protection only if it is 
‗truthful‘ (B.).8  
 
A. The rationale for the constitutional protection of the freedom of 
commercial expression 
 
To justify its decision in the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case, the US Supreme Court 
first focused on the individual parties to the transaction proposed in the commercial 
advertisement. It ruled that the fact that the advertiser‘s interest in a commercial 
advertisement was purely economic did not disqualify him from protection under the First 
Amendment.
9
 It also held that the protection enjoyed by advertisers seeking to disseminate 
prescription drug price information was also enjoyed by, and thus could be asserted by, the 
recipients of such information:  
                                                 
6
 Ibid, 762. 
7
 Ibid, 773. 
8
 The activity must also be ‗lawful‘. 
9
 Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Consumer Council (1976) 425 US 748, 762. 
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10
  
 
The US Supreme Court then generalised the benefits of commercial free speech to society as a 
whole:  
 
Even an individual advertisement, though entirely commercial, may be of general public 
interest … Obviously, not all commercial messages contain the same or even a very great 
public interest element. There are few to which such an element, however, could not be added. 
 
  Moreover, there is another consideration that suggests that no line between 
publicly ‗interesting‘ or ‗important‘ commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever 
be drawn. Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless 
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, 
and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the 
allocation of our resources in a large measure will be made through numerous private 
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be 
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is 
indispensable … It is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that 
system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought 
to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy, we could 
not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.
11
 
 
In other words, the US Supreme Court has extended the protection of the First Amendment to 
free speech due to the paramount role which advertising plays in a free market economy not 
only for economic operators, but also (and perhaps more importantly) for consumers and 
society as a whole. The free dissemination of commercial information allows businesses to 
promote their goods and services, while offering the possibility to consumers of being 
informed about goods and services in question, which may in turn lead to increased 
competition between manufacturers and service providers. The underlying assumption is that 
if a product or a service is lawfully available on the market, consumers should be able to 
know about it so that they can decide which one to choose among competing products and 
services.  
                                                 
10
 Ibid, 763. 
11
 Ibid, 764 and 765. 
Similarly, under Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),  
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. … 
 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that all forms of 
expression are protected under this provision, including commercial expression which 
consists in the provision of information, expression of ideas or communication of images as 
part of the promotion of a commercial activity and the concomitant right to receive such 
communications.
12
 At European Union level more specifically, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union has upheld the principle of freedom of expression as a general principle of 
EU law, the observance of which it ensures.
13
 The freedom of individuals to promote 
commercial activities derives not only from their right to engage in economic activities and 
the general commitment, in the EU context, to a market economy based upon free 
competition, but also from their inherent entitlement as human beings freely to express and 
receive views on any topic, including the merits of the goods or services which they market or 
                                                 
12
 See, eg, Markt Intern v Germany Series A no 165 (1990) 12 EHRR 161, paras 25 and 26; Groppera v 
Switzerland Series A no 173 (1990) 12 EHRR 321, para 55; and Casado Coca v Spain Series A no 285 (1994) 
18 EHRR 1, paras 35 and 36. 
13
 The Court of Justice of the EU draws upon the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and 
from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The ECHR has special significance in that respect: see, 
inter alia, Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, para 41; Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] 
ECR I-1611, para 37; Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, para 25; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger 
[2003] ECR I-5659, para 71; Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, para 48; and Case C-380/03 Germany v 
Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising II) [2006] ECR I-11573, para 154. See also Art 11(1) of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides: ‗Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.‘ On the importance of the right to free expression in the EU legal 
order, see D Wyatt, ‗Freedom of Expression in the EU Legal Order and in EU Relations with Third Countries‘ in 
J Beatson and Y Cripps (eds), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information: Essays in Honour of Sir 
David Williams (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000). 
purchase.
14
 This is all the more necessary as advertising is paramount to the establishment and 
functioning of the EU internal market, the ‗area where the free movement of goods, services, 
persons and capital is ensured‘15; it allows commercial operators to break down barriers, thus 
granting more choice to consumers and ensuring that their consumption habits do not 
crystallise along national lines.
16
  
This approach fits in with the model of consumer protection promoted by EU political 
institutions, which relies on the explicit assumption that consumers must be informed in order 
to be sufficiently confident to engage in cross-border transactions and take full advantage of 
the opportunities a wider market offers.
17
  
The information paradigm promoted both in the United States and in Europe may only be 
effective if the information is of sufficient quality to guide consumer choices and effectively 
allows them to ‗protect‘ themselves. Consumer empowerment may therefore justify public 
intervention requiring the disclosure of a certain standard of information. As Blackmun J 
stated in the Virginia Pharmacy case,  
the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech may make it appropriate to require 
that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional information, 
warnings and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.
18
 
  
Requiring that consumers be provided with specific information about a product or a 
service is a regulatory technique that has enjoyed considerable popularity in the development 
of EU measures affecting the protection of consumers‘ interests. It places the onus on 
                                                 
14
 Opinion of A-G Fennelly in Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising II) 
[2006] ECR I-11573, para 154. 
15
 Art 26 TFEU (ex Art 14 EC). 
16
 This was most vividly stated by A-G Jacobs in his seminal Opinion in Case C-412/93 Société d'Importation 
Edouard Leclerc-Siplec [1995] ECR I-179. 
17
 S Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy, 2nd edn (London, Elgar, 2005) 9. The Commission‘s 
Communication on the EU Consumer Policy Strategy for 2007–2013—incidentally entitled ‗Empowering 
Consumers, Enhancing Their Welfare, Effectively Protecting Them‘—states that ‗empowered and informed 
consumers can more easily make changes in lifestyle and consumption patterns contributing to the improvement 
of their health, more sustainable lifestyles and a low carbon economy‘: COM(2007) 99 final, 11. 
18
 (1976) 425 US 748, fn 24. 
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consumers to decide what is good for them and their families, expecting them to take their 
personal circumstances into account. The approach of improving transparency by providing 
enough relevant information has the advantage of minimising interference with individual 
choices. The provision of information is therefore seen as a compromise: protection is 
provided as a result of the introduction of duties on traders to inform consumers of the 
qualities of their goods and services, while avoiding intrusive controls, such as bans on 
particular types of contract, which may unduly diminish consumer choice.
19
 The rationale that 
well-informed consumers can be expected to manage their own affairs efficiently, provided 
that they are given the required information, has been applied to lifestyle choices. As regards 
food and dietary choices, for example, the assumption is that if consumers are aware of what 
each foodstuff contains, they should be trusted to apply their knowledge of nutrition and make 
appropriate choices. Rather than banning the marketing of a given foodstuff because of its 
high content of sugar, fat or salt, consumers are informed about this content, so that they can 
decide whether to buy it and integrate it into their diet. This reflects the view that in a society 
where individuals are autonomous and dislike limitations, they must take primary 
responsibility for the dietary choices they make on their own and their children‘s behalf. It 
also explains the focus which obesity prevention strategies in both the EU and the US have 
placed on the importance of providing information to consumers.
20
 The regulation of how the 
information is provided and what it should contain allows public authorities to support 
individual purchasing decisions without interfering too much with consumers‘ personal 
freedom to buy what they want and with business operators‘ freedom to respond to, or even 
shape, consumer demand through advertising.
21
 The responsibility for healthy choices is 
therefore shared between, on the one hand, consumers, who are expected to process the 
information made available to them when purchasing goods and services, and, on the other, 
regulatory authorities, which must ensure that enough information is made available to 
                                                 
19
 Weatherill, above n 17, 84. 
20
 For the EU Strategy, see in particular the Commission‘s White Paper laying down a strategy for Europe on 
nutrition, overweight, and obesity related health issues, COM(2007) 279 final. For the US Strategy, see White 
House Task Force on Childhood Obesity, Solving the Problem of Childhood Obesity within a Generation, 
Report to the President, 11 May 2010, available at <www.letsmove.gov/tfco_fullreport_may2010.pdf>, accessed 
12 July 2010. 
21
 Commission‘s White Paper, above n 20, 5. 
consumers and that such information is neither false nor misleading.
22
 As commercial 
information is seen as a necessary channel through which relevant information on competing 
goods and services reaches consumers, one could argue that disclosure obligations resting on 
commercial operators promote free speech in that they reinforce the underlying assumption 
that commercial information guides consumer choices.
23
 
At the EU level, a range of legislative measures has been adopted in order to ensure that 
consumers are provided with the information they need to make informed purchasing 
decisions. Commercial operators are therefore required to disclose information which they are 
most unlikely to disclose on a voluntary basis but which is nonetheless considered important 
in order to guide consumer choices. For example, Directive 2001/37/EC obliges tobacco 
manufacturers not only to disclose the ingredients used in the manufacturing of cigarettes and 
other tobacco products, but also to affix health warnings to their products. Each unit packet of 
tobacco products intended to be smoked must carry a general warning (‗Smoking 
Kills‘/‗Smoking can kill‘ or ‗Smoking seriously harms you and others around you‘) covering 
at least 30–35 per cent of the front, and one of the 14 additional warning sets covering at least 
40–50 per cent of the back. Non-combustible tobacco products shall carry the general warning 
‗This tobacco product can damage your health and is addictive‘.24 In 2002, British American 
Tobacco Limited and Imperial Tobacco Limited challenged the validity of the Directive. The 
Court of Justice dismissed the action on the ground that Article 95 EC (now Article 114 
TFEU) constituted an adequate legal basis and that the EU legislature had not exceeded the 
limit on its discretion:  
                                                 
22
 One could argue that the food industry has a role to play in obesity-prevention strategies, not least by 
complying with disclosure requirements laid down by law and ensuring that the information it provides to 
consumers is not misleading, as discussed below. 
23
 As Eric Barendt puts it, ‗disclosure requirements are hardly controversial … Since the best arguments for 
freedom of commercial speech are based on the interests of consumers in finding out attributes of the goods and 
services they want to buy, rather than speakers‘ rights, there is no good reason for holding that advertisers have 
any right not to provide information. The recipients‘ interests do justify a limit on the speakers‘ rights, for the 
latter are derivative from the former. Unlike free speech in the context of politics and the arts, they are primarily 
not the rights of the speaker, but of the consumer or client‘: E Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd edn (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2005) 412.  
24
 Directive 2001/37/EC, Art 5. 
… those obligations in fact constitute a recognised means of encouraging consumers to reduce 
their consumption of tobacco products or guiding them towards such of those products as pose 
less risk to health.
25
 
  
Now that this Directive is in force in all the Member States, tobacco manufacturers are under 
a duty to fix warnings to their products. If they fail to do so, they are in breach of statutory 
requirements. This also means, by contrast, that if they label their products as required by law, 
they will probably have fulfilled their obligation to inform and are under no further obligation 
to warn against any damage which tobacco may cause.
26
  
Directive 2001/37/EC allows Member States to require additional warnings in the form of 
colour photographs and other illustrations.
27
 For that purpose the Commission adopted rules 
for the use of pictorial warnings and established a library of 42 selected sourced documents.
28
 
There are three images for each health warning, and Member States can choose illustrations 
most suitable for consumers in their country.
29
  
                                                 
25
 Case C-491/01 BAT and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, para 131. 
26
 German Landgericht Bielefeld, Decision of 15/01/2000, 8 O 411/99, (2000) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
2514, §3 d) aa); Landgericht Arnsberg, Judgment of 14 November 2003, 2 O 204/02, (2004) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 232, §75. The fact that the damage caused by tobacco is known by the general public may further 
shape the scope of the duty to inform. In any event, even if tobacco companies failed to comply with labelling 
requirements, this would not necessarily mean that causation between the damage and their failure to inform 
would be established: Cour de Cassation, Première Chambre Civile, Suzanne X, 8 November 2007. 
27
 Directive 2001/37/EC, Art 5(3). 
28
 Decision 2003/641/EC, [2003] OJ L226/24. 
29
 Discussions are currently taking place in the Commission‘s DG on Health and Consumer Protection as to 
whether the duty of tobacco manufacturers to affix health warnings to their products should not be strengthened 
in the sense of using pictorial warnings containing shock images in an attempt to persuade buyers to stop 
smoking. Some Member States, including Belgium, Romania, the UK and Latvia, require that such pictorial 
warnings be used. This could be extended to all Member States via EU legislation: see Sambrook Research 
International, A Review of the Science Base to Support the Development of Health Warnings for Tobacco 
Packages, Report prepared for DG SANCO, Brussels, 27 May 2010, available at 
<ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/docs/warnings_report_en.pdf>, accessed 12 July 2010. As the WHO has stated, 
‗health warnings on tobacco packages increase smokers‘ awareness of their risk. Use of pictures with graphic 
depictions of disease and other negative images has greater impact than words alone, and is critical in reaching 
the large number of people worldwide who cannot read. Experience in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
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The question of what constitutes sufficient information is far from straightforward. The 
debates on the nutrition information consumers need to have at their disposal to make 
healthier dietary choices illustrate the difficulties facing public authorities. Article 3 of 
Directive 2000/13 enumerates the features that must be included on all food labels: the name 
of the product; the list of ingredients; the quantities of the product; the date of durability; 
storage conditions; the manufacturer‘s or packager‘s details; as well as information on origin 
and alcohol content where necessary. Although the list of ingredients provides a hint about the 
nutritional qualities of a foodstuff, EU law as it currently stands does not require producers to 
provide detailed nutrition information. Nutrition labelling is optional, except when a nutrition 
claim is made in the labelling, presentation or advertising of a pre-packaged foodstuff. Where 
a nutrition claim refers to sugars, saturated fatty acids, dietary fibre or sodium, the 
information provided must comprise the energy value and the amount of protein, 
carbohydrate, sugar, fat, saturated fatty acids, dietary fibre and sodium (Group 2). Otherwise, 
it need only comprise the energy value and amount of protein, carbohydrate and fat (Group 
1).
30
 
All stakeholders agree that the current framework is no longer fit for purpose: in light of 
growing obesity rates, consumers need to pay particular attention to the dietary choices they 
make and must have at their disposal the nutrition information required to do so. There are, 
however, strong disagreements between the food industry, on the one hand, and consumer and 
public health advocates, on the other, regarding what nutrition information is necessary. After 
a consultation process of more than three years, the Commission published, on 30 January 
2008, a Draft Regulation on the provision of food information to consumers, which proposes 
to introduce mandatory labelling of key nutritional elements which must appear in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Thailand and other countries, shows that strong health warnings on tobacco packages, particularly pictorial 
warnings, are an important information source for younger smokers and also for people in countries with low 
literacy rates. Pictures are also effective in conveying messages to children—especially the children of tobacco 
users, who are the most likely to start using tobacco themselves … Policies mandating health warnings on 
tobacco packages cost governments nothing to implement. Pictorial warnings are overwhelmingly supported by 
the public and generally encounter little resistance, except from the tobacco industry itself‘ (WHO Report on the 
Global Tobacco Epidemic, The MPOWER Package, Geneva, 2008, 34 and 35). 
30
 Directive 2000/13, Art 4. 
principal field of vision.
31 
Determining how detailed the nutrition declaration should be 
requires that the advantages of information be weighed against the burden for commercial 
operators: how much would it cost the food industry, and what benefits would it bring 
European consumers, to have eight or more, rather than three, four or five, compulsory 
nutrients included on food labels? The Impact Assessment published alongside the 
Commission‘s proposal found that the cost to the industry as a whole for collecting the 
information on five elements would vary from €0.7 billion to €2.3 billion, depending on the 
method of calculation used to determine food composition; whereas the cost would vary from 
€1.1 billion to €3.7 billion if nine elements were required. Moreover, the five nutritional 
elements that have been suggested as being included either alone or with other nutritional 
elements are those that were most often referred to in consultations as being of interest to the 
consumer and which have been identified by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as 
playing a major role in the development of obesity and non-communicable diseases.
32
 Article 
29 of the Draft Regulation therefore provides for the mandatory disclosure of these five 
elements: energy value and the amounts of fat, saturates, carbohydrates (with specific 
reference to sugars) and salt.
33
  
 
B. The prohibition of false and misleading advertising 
 
The model of consumer protection based on the information paradigm presupposes that the 
information which traders provide to consumers is reliable. The US Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the constitutional protection granted to commercial speech is subject to 
                                                 
31
 COM(2008) 40 final. 
32
 SEC(2008) 94, 47. 
33
 Art 29(1) of the Commission‘s Proposed Regulation: COM(2008) 40 final. The European Parliament recently 
voted in favour of mandatory nutrition disclosure. It confirmed that the Commission‘s proposal that the nutrition 
declaration should comprise information on the amounts of energy, fat, saturates, sugars and salts should be 
mentioned, and proposed to add the amounts of protein, carbohydrates, fibre, and transfats: Amendment 144, 
Resolution of 16 June 2010, P7_TA(2010)0222. 
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the condition that the information must not be false or misleading. Untruthful speech has 
never been protected for its own sake.
34
  
The notion of ‗misleading information‘ is difficult to define: not only does it encapsulate 
inaccurate statements, but it also covers statements which convey an unreliable impression, 
leading consumers to buy a good or a service they may not have bought had they understood 
the significance of the statement in question. The EU legislature has therefore put flesh on the 
bones of the framework legislation on unfair commercial practices
35
 by adopting a range of 
more specific, sectoral instruments. Two examples will illustrate the difficulties involved in 
defining ‗misleading information‘. 
The use of the adjective ‗light‘ on cigarettes and other tobacco products may be 
understood as suggesting that light cigarettes are less detrimental to health than regular 
cigarettes. Nevertheless, a range of studies has established that this belief is misconceived.
36
 
Consequently, several smokers or their estates have sued tobacco manufacturers, both in the 
United States where ‗tobacco litigation‘ originated in the 1960s37 and in Europe, for inducing 
them into believing that light cigarettes were less harmful than other cigarettes. Courts and 
juries in the US have proved to be quite receptive to arguments that the tobacco 
manufacturers‘ claims for ‗light‘ cigarettes were misleading. For example, a jury decided in 
2002 that Philip Morris had lied to the public in marketing its ‗light‘ cigarettes as an 
alternative to quitting smoking. Their reasoning was based on internal industry documents 
revealing that cigarette manufacturers intentionally deceived the public by targeting smokers 
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 See in particular Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Consumer Council (1976) 425 US 748. This makes 
commercial speech a lesser form of expression than political or artistic speech. Ensuring that the stream of 
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 Directive 2005/29/EC on business-to-consumer unfair commercial practices, [2005] OJ L149/22, has 
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 M Thun and D Burns, ‗Health Impact of ―Reduced Yield‖ Cigarettes: A Critical Assessment of the 
Epidemiological Evidence‘ (2001) Tobacco Control i4–i11. 
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 For a history of tobacco litigation in the US, see in particular M Miura, R Daynard and J Samet, ‗The Role of 
Litigation in Tobacco Control‘ (2006) Supplement Salud Pública de México S121; M Molitoris, ‗Tabakprozesse 
in den USA, Deutschland und Anderen Europäischen Ländern‘ (2004) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3662; and 
B Bitas and P Barros, ‘Tobacco Control and the Role of Litigation: A Survey of Issues in Law, Policy, and 
Economics‘ (2008) SSRN Paper 1121000, 22.  
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who felt anxious about their health but were too addicted to stop smoking. In a similar case, 
the jury awarded the survivors of a smoker $160,000 in compensatory damages and $150 
million in punitive damages. An appellate court reversed the punitive damages award and 
remanded for a new trial on that issue, but the Oregon Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs 
permission for review.38 In December 2008, the US Supreme Court rejected the attempt by 
Philip Morris to have all ‗light‘ cigarette lawsuits dismissed, on the ground that these suits 
were not pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act.
39
  
Several courts in Europe have also been called upon to adjudicate in similar cases. In 
Italy, a smoker initiated proceedings against BAT Italia for minimising the detrimental effects 
of light cigarettes on his health and for making him lose the opportunity freely to choose an 
alternative solution to his smoking problem. The case reached the Corte di Cassazione (the 
Italian Supreme Court in civil matters). The Court accepted that the wording ‗light‘ was 
misleading. The claimant nonetheless lost the case on the ground that he should also have 
established the existence of a causal link between the misleading use of the word ‗light‘ and 
the damage allegedly suffered.
40
  
To reduce the fragmentation of national rules, and therefore facilitate the functioning of 
the internal market, the EU legislature has adopted legislation prohibiting the use of adjectives 
such as ‗light‘ in the marketing of tobacco products. In particular, Article 7 of Directive 
2001/37/EC bans the use on the packaging of tobacco products of texts, names, trademarks 
and figurative or other signs suggesting that a particular tobacco product is less harmful than 
others.
41
 The Court of Justice upheld the validity of the Directive and Article 7 more 
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 [2001] OJ L194/26. Moreover, Directive 2003/33/EC, [2003] OJ L152/16, bans all forms of tobacco 
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42
 It noted that this article had the purpose of ensuring that consumers are given 
objective information concerning the toxicity of tobacco products,
43
 and that the EU 
legislature was entitled to ban the use of descriptors such as ‗light‘ on cigarettes in that such 
descriptors are liable to mislead consumers: 
 
In the first place, they might, like the word ‗mild‘, for example, indicate a sensation of taste, 
without any connection with the product‘s level of noxious substances. In the second place, 
such terms such as ‗low-tar‘, ‗light‘, ‗ultra-light‘, do not, in the absence of rules governing the 
use of those terms, refer to specific quantitative limits. In the third place, even if the product in 
question is lower in tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide than other products, the fact remains 
that the amount of those substances actually inhaled by consumers depends on their manner of 
smoking and that that product may contain other harmful substances. In the fourth place, the 
use of descriptions which suggest that consumption of a certain tobacco product is beneficial 
to health, compared with other tobacco products, is liable to encourage smoking.44 
  
The regulation of food claims raises similar difficulties. The advent of processed food has 
made it ever more difficult for consumers to know what they are eating. Making healthy 
choices has therefore become correspondingly more onerous. The increased reliance by 
consumers on nutrition and health claims
45
 may be seen as a positive evolutionary step to the 
extent that such claims can provide them with more elements from which to compare products 
and make informed purchasing decisions, which may in turn contribute to public health 
objectives by encouraging food manufacturers to reformulate their products and produce more 
foods containing lower quantities of less healthy ingredients, and in particular saturated fat, 
sugar and salt. On the other hand, nutrition and health claims are also a powerful marketing 
tool, and may give rise to difficulties when the claims in question mislead consumers rather 
than inform their choices. For example, what do claims such as ‗low fat‘ or ‗50% less fat‘ 
mean in the absence of common thresholds?  
                                                 
42
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Since 1978, EU legislation has required that food labelling should not mislead 
consumers. Despite this requirement, however, there were no harmonised standards in Europe 
until Regulation 1924/2006/EC on nutrition and health claims made on food ('the Food 
Claims Regulation') was adopted in December 2006.
46
 This Regulation, the dual objective of 
which is to facilitate free movement while providing a high level of consumer protection, sets 
common standards intended to assist European consumers in understanding the nutrition 
properties of certain foods. Most importantly, it requires that nutrition and health claims on 
foods placed on the EU market shall not be false, ambiguous or misleading.
47
 Such claims 
should be based on, and substantiated by, generally accepted scientific evidence, with the 
burden of proof resting on the food business operators making the claims in question.
48
 
Moreover, nutrition or health claims may be made only if the presence, absence or reduced 
content of the substance in respect of which the claim is made has been shown to have a 
beneficial nutritional physiological effect.
49
  
This requires, first, that the average consumer can be expected to understand the 
beneficial effects as expressed in the claim and, secondly, that the amount of the product that 
can reasonably be expected to be consumed provides a significant quantity of the substance to 
which the claim relates.
50
 In particular, certain claims will no longer be permitted if they rely 
on technical scientific terms of which consumers cannot be expected to have detailed 
knowledge, even though such claims are based on scientifically well-founded evidence.
51
 
Claims that a product is ‗90% fat free‘ are no longer allowed either: although perfectly 
correct, they are still misleading insofar as they suggest that the product in question has a low 
fat content, whereas 10% fat is actually fairly high. The Regulation allows ‗low fat‘ claims 
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47
 Ibid, Art 3. 
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compliance with the Food Claims Regulation. 
49
 Ibid, Art 5. 
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 ‗Five a Day‘ claims (namely,  claims that consuming a given foodstuff contributes to the recommended daily 
intake of five portions of fruit and vegetable) are now also prohibited if they are made on products that need to 
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 Regulation 1924/2006/EC, Art 5(2).
 
only for products containing no more than 3g of fat per 100g, or 1.5g per 100ml. In effect, to 
make a nutrition claim, a food business operator must comply with the requirements laid 
down in the Annex of the Regulation.
52
 Consequently, the Food Claims Regulation has 
constrained the freedom of commercial operators to promote their foodstuffs in order to 
ensure that the information provided to consumers is of value to them and helps them make 
healthier choices. 
The information paradigm, which emphasises the importance of consumer information 
for empowered consumer choices and therefore views consumer awareness as a public health 
tool, reflects a model of consumer protection placing the onus largely on individual 
consumers to ‗protect‘ themselves. Nevertheless, courts on both sides of the Atlantic have 
accepted that commercial speech may have to be limited in certain cases, even though it does 
not contain any misleading information. 
 
 
III. Public Health Protection as a Limit on the Freedom of 
Commercial Operators to Promote their Goods and Services 
 
The freedom of commercial operators to advertise their goods and services is not absolute 
(A.); it must be balanced against competing interests, including public health protection (B.).  
 
A. The freedom of commercial expression is not absolute 
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 Ibid, Art 8(1). The Annex at present contains conditions for the use of 24 nutrition claims. As Regulation 
1924/2006/EC is a horizontal instrument applying without prejudice to more specific provisions, there may be 
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 Article 10(2) of the ECHR explicitly states that the right of commercial operators to promote 
their goods and services may be limited:  
 
The exercise of [the freedoms to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and 
ideas], since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
This provision makes it clear that the protection of public health constitutes an overriding 
requirement of public interest justifying that some limits may be set by law on the freedom of 
commercial operators to advertise their goods or services. Such restrictions must, however, be 
proportionate.  
Even though the First Amendment to the US Constitution does not explicitly provide for 
derogations (on public health or other grounds), the US Supreme Court has laid down a test 
referred to as the Central Hudson test, which resembles the test laid down by Article 10(2) of 
the ECHR. The Central Hudson case involved a New York regulation imposing a complete 
ban on promotional advertising by electric utilities companies. The regulation rested on the 
finding that the interconnected utility system in New York state did not have sufficient fuel 
stocks or sources of supply to continue furnishing all customer demands for the winter of 
1973/74. Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the New York Public Service 
Commission requested comments on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional 
advertising, and decided to extend the prohibition in 1977. Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corporation challenged the ban on the ground that it violated the First Amendment. After 
noting that commercial speech was at stake, the US Supreme Court ruled: 
 
If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government‘s 
power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by 
restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion 
to that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State‘s 
goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction 
must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it 
provides only ineffective or remote support for the government‘s purpose. Second, if the 
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial 
speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.
53
 
 
This test has been relied upon in several subsequent rulings of the US Supreme Court 
concerning the compatibility of advertising restrictions with the First Amendment. It is clear 
that the protection of public health amounts to a ‗substantial interest‘ of the State, as explicitly 
stated in cases involving restrictions on the advertising of gambling services,
54
 alcoholic 
beverages
55
 and tobacco products.
56
 
At EU level, some advertising restrictions imposed either by the EU legislature or by 
national authorities have been challenged as being contrary to the EU Treaties. In its case law, 
the Court of Justice has recognised, in line with the principles stemming from the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, that commercial expression is a lesser form of 
expression than political or artistic expression. The exercise of freedom of expression may 
therefore be subject to certain restrictions in order to protect public health.
57
 The duty of EU 
institutions to mainstream public health concerns into all EU policies,
58
 coupled with the 
recognition that the imperative of free movement has never been unlimited, has led the Court 
of Justice to uphold the validity of the Tobacco Advertising Directive imposing a ban on all 
forms of cross-border advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products,
59
 as well as 
restrictions imposed by Member States, in the absence of common rules, on the advertising of 
alcoholic beverages
60
 or gambling services.
61
 This approach reflects the view that the 
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 Arts 168(1) and 114(3) TFEU (ex Arts 152(1) and 95(3) EC).  
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 Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR I-1795 and Case C-429/02 Bacardi France [2004] ECR I-6613. 
marketing of certain goods (tobacco products, alcohol, medicines, unhealthy food) and 
services (medicinal treatments, gambling services) is a contributory factor in a range of 
chronic diseases.
62
  
The Court of Justice has stated that in order to restrict the freedom of commercial operators to 
promote their goods and services, the relevant public authority must establish that the 
restriction it is in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims 
under that provision and necessary in a democratic society—that is to say, justified by a 
pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
63
 Thus, 
assessing the extent to which public authorities may restrict the marketing of harmful goods 
and services with a view to protecting public health very much rests on determining how 
competing interests should be balanced against each other: on the one hand, the freedom of 
expression of commercial operators to promote their goods and services; and, on the other 
hand, the interest of public authorities to restrict such promotion to limit the consumption of 
certain goods and services and ensure a higher level of public health. The proportionality 
assessment is therefore crucial in assessing the lawfulness of regulatory measures imposed by 
a public body with a view to restricting the promotion by commercial operators of the goods 
and services they have lawfully placed on the market. 
 
B. The key role of the principle of proportionality 
 
Proportionality refers to the intensity or scale of legislative action. Article 5(4) TEU provides 
that ‗under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties‘; New Protocol No 2 on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality adds that  
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 See, to this effect, Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689, para 26; Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] 
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draft legislative acts shall take account of the need for any burden, whether financial or  
administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, 
economic operators and citizens, to be minimized and commensurate with the objective to be 
achieved.
64  
 
The means must be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve it.
65
  
The rest of this chapter compares the approach of the Court of Justice of the EU with the 
approach of the US Supreme Court to the proportionality assessment in cases where public 
health protection has been invoked to justify restrictions on the freedom of commercial 
operators to advertise their goods and services. Overall, the Court of Justice has left a broad 
margin of discretion to EU institutions and Member States, while the US Supreme Court has 
adopted a much less lenient approach to advertising restrictions. This difference is vividly 
illustrated by the constitutional challenges mounted against advertising restrictions imposed 
on tobacco products and alcoholic beverages on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
1. The failure of the Court of Justice to engage with existing evidence 
 
The Tobacco Advertising litigation offers some useful indications as to how the Court of 
Justice assesses the proportionality of EU law measures, and measures relating to advertising 
restrictions more specifically. Germany had challenged two Directives (adopted respectively 
in 1998
66
 and in 2003
67
) banning tobacco advertising and sponsorship on a variety of grounds. 
In the first case, the Court did not need to rule on whether the measure infringed the principle 
of proportionality, since it annulled the 1998 Directive in its entirety on the ground that the 
EU did not have the necessary powers to adopt the measure in question.
68
 In the second case, 
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however, the Court held that the EU legislature had not infringed the principle of conferral by 
adopting the 2003 Directive, and then moved on to assess the other arguments invoked by 
Germany, including whether the measure had been adopted in breach of the principle of 
proportionality.
69
 
The Court of Justice recalled its settled case law that the Union‘s legislature must be 
allowed a broad margin of discretion in areas which entail political, economic and social 
choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. The 
legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly 
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to 
pursue.
70
 In its earlier ruling in the Karner case, the Court had added that it would be reluctant 
to intervene with the margin of discretion left to competent authorities in relation to the 
commercial use of freedom of expression, ‗particularly in a field as complex and fluctuating 
as advertising‘.71 On this basis, the Court continued:  
 
In the present case, even assuming that the measures laid down in Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Directive prohibiting advertising and sponsorship have the effect of weakening freedom of 
expression indirectly, journalistic freedom of expression, as such, remains unimpaired and the 
editorial contributions of journalists are therefore not affected. It must therefore be found that 
the [EU] legislature did not, by adopting such measures, exceed the limits of the discretion 
which it is expressly accorded. It follows that those measures cannot be regarded as 
disproportionate.
72
 
 
In this judgment, the Court of Justice failed to perform the balancing exercise which the 
principle of proportionality requires. The same observation may be made for cases involving 
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the compatibility of national measures imposing advertising restrictions with general free 
movement provisions. In the Gourmet case, the Court was called upon to assess whether the 
Swedish ban on alcohol advertising was contrary to the provisions on the free movement of 
goods and on the freedom to provide services.
73
 It held: 
 
The decision as to whether the prohibition on advertising at issue in the main proceedings is 
proportionate, and in particular as to whether the objective sought might be achieved by less 
extensive prohibitions or restrictions or by prohibitions or restrictions having less effect on 
intra-[Union] trade, calls for an analysis of the circumstances of law and of fact which 
characterise the situation in the Member State concerned, which the national court is in a better 
position than the Court of Justice to carry out.
 74
  
 
As Andrea Biondi has noted,  
the judicial solution of dumping everything on the national court is very disappointing … The 
decision not to decide and leave it up to the national court is a clear indication of the 
unwillingness of the Court to interfere with Member States‘ policies in certain delicate area.75  
 
If it is true that the Gourmet judgment originated from a preliminary reference, where the 
referring court should settle the dispute between the parties, it is arguable that the Court of 
Justice failed in this case to provide the guidance necessary to assist the national authorities in 
discharging their duty to ensure that EU law is upheld.
76
 Nevertheless, in the internal market, 
where the free movement of goods and services is ensured, the discretion of Member States to 
impose restrictions on commercial operators‘ freedom to promote their goods and services 
should be constrained by a more rigorous proportionality assessment, particularly when 
evidence exists supporting the proposed course of action rather than an alternative one.
77
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The Court‘s reasoning is strikingly brief in both these cases and, as such, differs 
markedly from the reasoning of Advocate-General Fennelly on exactly the same point in the 
first Tobacco Advertising case, that of Advocate-General Léger in the second Tobacco 
Advertising case, and that of Advocate-General Jacobs in Gourmet. Two points should be 
underlined. First, the structure of both the free movement provisions and Article 10 of the 
ECHR requires that the public authority wishing to impose advertising restrictions should 
bear the burden of establishing that the measure is necessary, and that no measures exist 
which are less restrictive of trade and of the freedom of commercial operators to promote their 
goods and services. Secondly, the Court of Justice must scrutinise the evidence presented to 
ensure that the public health argument put forward to justify advertising restrictions is 
convincing and does not rely on assumptions or, worse, prejudice. Very often, such evidence 
will exist and will allow public authorities to restrict advertising for goods or services the 
excessive consumption of which is harmful. 
For example, the rationale for the Tobacco Advertising Directive is that consumption of 
tobacco products is dangerous to the health of smokers and—one could add—to people 
around them; that the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products promote such 
consumption; and that the prohibition of those forms of expression will result in a reduction in 
tobacco consumption and, thus, improved public health.
78
 The damage caused to health by 
smoking has not been disputed in the Tobacco Advertising cases, and Germany underlined its 
own desire to reduce consumption among its population. There has, however, been 
considerable debate over whether the prohibition of most forms of promotion of tobacco 
products can achieve a reduction in consumption of tobacco, rather than simply affecting 
competition between tobacco brands. It is useful at this stage to refer to the evidence gathered 
by the WHO, which supports comprehensive bans on tobacco advertising and all other forms 
of promotion:  
 
The tobacco industry claims that its advertising and promotion efforts are not intended to 
expand sales or attract new users, but simply to reallocate market share among existing users. 
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 Recital 3 of the Preamble to the Tobacco Advertising Directive provides that ‗the legislation of the Member 
States to be approximated is intended to protect public health by regulating the promotion of tobacco, an 
addictive product responsible for over half a million deaths in the Community annually, thereby avoiding a 
situation where young people begin smoking at an early age as a result of promotion and become addicted‘. 
This is not true. Marketing and promotion increase tobacco sales and therefore contribute 
towards killing more people by encouraging current smokers to smoke more and decreasing 
their motivation to quit. Marketing also urges potential users—and young people 
specifically—to try tobacco and become long-term customers. Tobacco advertising targeting 
youth and specific demographic subgroups is particularly effective. 
 
Marketing creates other obstacles that blunt tobacco control efforts. Widespread tobacco 
advertising ‗normalises‘ tobacco, depicting it as being no different from any other consumer 
product. That makes it difficult for people to understand the hazards of tobacco use. Marketing 
falsely associates tobacco with desirable qualities such as youth, energy, glamour and sex 
appeal. It also strengthens the tobacco industry‘s influence over the media, as well as sporting 
and entertainment businesses, through billions of dollars in annual spending on advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship … 
 
A ban on marketing and promotion is a powerful weapon against the tobacco epidemic … 
 
To be effective, bans must be complete and apply to all marketing and promotional categories. 
If only television and radio advertising is blocked, the tobacco industry will move its budgets 
to other marketing avenues, such as newspapers, magazines, billboards or the Internet. If all 
traditional advertising is blocked, the industry will convert advertising expenditure to 
sponsorship of events popular among youth such as racing, sports, music festivals …79 
 
Consequently, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the first public health treaty 
ever adopted under the auspices of the WHO, calls upon its Contracting Parties
80
 to recognise 
that a comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and sponsorship would reduce the 
consumption of tobacco products, and to undertake, in accordance with their constitutions or 
constitutional principles, a comprehensive ban on all tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship, including a cross-border ban on advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
originating from their territories.
81
 
The Court of Justice should review existing evidence, rather than simply rule that the EU 
legislature or national authorities should be granted a broad margin of discretion. Ensuring 
that the choices of the EU legislature or national authorities are reasonable in the light of 
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references to a range of supporting studies, including studies carried out before the Tobacco Advertising 
Directive was adopted. 
80
 168 to date, including the EU and its 27 Member States. 
81
 Art 13, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 
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existing evidence does not mean that the Court would be substituting its own assessment for 
theirs. If the EU legislature or Member States wish to adopt a cautious approach, the Court of 
Justice should respect their decision. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it should feel 
exempted from its duty, as the EU‘s constitutional court, to review the proportionality of 
legislative measures: the burden of proving that a public health measure is proportionate rests 
on legislative authorities, and the Court must ensure that they have discharged this burden. 
Discretion is not to be equated with arbitrariness.  
Furthermore, it is arguable that the application of a stronger standard of review by the 
Court of Justice will reinforce the constitutionality of advertising bans and ultimately lead to a 
higher level of public health protection. In light of the fact that the Court has allowed freedom 
of commercial expression to be restricted for public health reasons in several cases, it is 
tempting to suggest that these cases have heralded a clear victory for public health over 
commercial expression. On the other hand, the insufficient and therefore unconvincing 
reasoning of the Court may cut both ways. Its lack of guidance on how the proportionality of 
a measure should be assessed could have perverse results on the legislative process more 
generally, in that it does not encourage the EU legislature or national authorities to justify 
their choices. In other words, the excessively loose standard of review applied by the Court 
sends out the wrong message. A stricter standard of review would provide the necessary 
incentive for the EU legislature or national authorities to improve ex ante mechanisms and 
ensure that the legislative measures they adopt are both as protective of public health and as 
respectful of fundamental rights as possible. The less the legislature does consider the balance 
and engage in a thorough assessment of competing interests, the stronger the possibility for 
commercial operators to claim that their freedom of expression has been unduly restricted and 
that they have been unfairly stigmatised.  
The debates concerning the regulation of the marketing of unhealthy food to children 
illustrate these points. Over the last 15 years there has been growing concern that much of the 
food marketed to children is high in fat, salt and sugar, and has both immediate and long-term 
damaging effects on their health. It conditions and habituates children to an unhealthy diet, 
contributes to overweight and obesity, causing elevated blood pressure, cholesterol and blood 
sugar levels, and leads to type 2 diabetes. Nevertheless, food operators have objected that 
exposing children to food advertising does not lead to obesity as such, arguing that the main 
problem which children encounter is their lack of physical activity. Following the industry‘s 
claim that the relationship between eating patterns and television advertising is not 
established,
82
 research has become more focused and has attempted to prove the causal link 
between food advertising and children‘s weight. Various regulatory authorities have 
commissioned independent research to explore whether a correlation exists between weight 
gain and children‘s exposure to food marketing. The evidence gathered so far suggests that 
such a correlation does exist, and it has identified the need to restrict the promotion of 
unhealthy food to children.
83
 Consequently, in its Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity 
and Health, the WHO identified the regulation of the marketing of food to children as an area 
requiring further action and initiated wide-ranging consultations with Contracting Parties, 
with representatives of the food and advertising industries, and with public health and 
consumer advocates.
84
 Similarly, the European Commission specifically asked stakeholders 
for their views on how food advertising to children should be regulated in the consultation 
which led to its Obesity Prevention White Paper of May 2007.
85
  
The developing evidence base has led to a range of policy initiatives at different levels. 
At EU level, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive provides that  
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 The food industry has claimed for years that if children who watch a lot of television are getting fat, it is due to 
their insufficient levels of physical activity, rather than to its intensive marketing of unhealthy foods. Even if 
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simplistic.  
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 For a review of the evidence, see in particular J Harris, J Pomeranz, T Lobstein and K Brownell, ‗A Crisis in 
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 Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (Geneva, WHO, May 2004), para 40(3): ‗[F]ood 
advertising affects food choices and influences dietary habits. Food and beverage advertisements should not 
exploit children‘s inexperience or credulity. Messages that encourage unhealthy dietary practices or physical 
inactivity should be discouraged, and positive, healthy messages encouraged. Governments should work with 
consumer groups and the private sector (including advertising) to develop appropriate multi-sectorial approaches 
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advertising‘.  
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para V.1.2. 
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Member States and the Commission shall encourage media service providers to develop codes 
of conduct regarding inappropriate audiovisual commercial communication, accompanying or 
included in children‘s programmes, of foods and beverages containing nutrients and 
substances with a nutritional or physiological effect, in particular those such as fat, trans-fatty 
acids, salt/sodium and sugars, excessive intakes of which in the overall diet are not 
recommended.
86
  
 
Despite its ineffectiveness,
87
 this provision nonetheless recognises the need to restrict the 
exposure of children to unhealthy food marketing.  
At the national level, following an extensive consultation process, the UK has adopted 
measures which go further than the minimum standard laid down at EU level by the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive and which are more likely to reduce the marketing 
pressure on children. These measures, which came into effect on a phased basis from April 
2007 to 1 January 2009, include a total ban on unhealthy food advertising in and around all 
children‘s television programming and on dedicated children‘s channels, as well as in youth-
orientated and adult programmes which attract a significantly higher than average proportion 
of viewers under the age of 16.
88
 
At the global level, on 21 May 2010 the 63rd World Health Assembly endorsed a set 
of recommendations on the marketing of foods and non-alcoholic beverages to children, 
calling on Contracting Parties to reduce both the exposure and the power of marketing.
89
 The 
recommendations encourage the Contracting Parties—though it does not oblige them—to 
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 On the EU‘s obesity prevention strategy, and the failure of the EU to deal convincingly with the exposure of 
children to food marketing more specifically, see A Garde, EU Law and Obesity Prevention (The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 2010) ch 5. For sceptical views on the reliance of public authorities on self-regulatory 
standards to curb food marketing to children, see C Hawkes, ‗Self-Regulation of Food Advertising: What It Can, 
Could and Cannot Do to Discourage Unhealthy Eating Habits Among Children‘ (2005) British Nutrition 
Foundation: Nutrition Bulletin 374; see also D Ludwig and M Nestle, ‗Can the Food Industry Play a 
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Sharma, S Teret and K Brownell, ‗The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: Standards to Promote Success and 
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 For details, see <www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/foodads_new/>, accessed 12 July 2010. 
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2010.   
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adopt approaches which are as comprehensive as possible, thus recognising that a 
comprehensive approach has the highest potential to achieve the desired objective. They also 
acknowledge the central role of State authorities in policy-making:  
Government should be the key stakeholders in the development of policy and provide 
leadership through a multi-stakeholder platform for implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. In setting national policy framework, governments may choose to allocate defined 
roles to other stakeholders, while protecting the public interest and avoiding conflict of 
interest.
90
  
 
The fact that the marketing of unhealthy food to children has now been proven to 
contribute to an ‗obesogenic‘ environment reinforces the basis for invoking public health 
arguments to limit the freedom of commercial operators to promote unhealthy food to 
children. Nevertheless, this does not mean that public authorities will not have to exercise 
their discretion in deciding how far food marketing should be restricted. Several questions 
have not been conclusively answered by existing evidence. In particular, there seems to be no 
agreement concerning the age until which children need specifically to be protected from 
unhealthy food marketing: age 12 (EU Company Pledge
91
), age 13 (Danish National Code
92
), 
age 14 (Australian Food and Beverage Industry‘s Initiative on Responsible Children‘s 
Marketing
93
) or age 16 (Ofcom Regulations in the UK
94
)? 
The approach adopted by the Province of Quebec is instructive in this respect. The 
Canadian Supreme Court had to decide in the Irwin Toy case whether Quebec legislation—
which was the first to ban, as of 1980, all forms of advertising to children under 13—was 
compatible with the Canadian Constitution. The Court confirmed that advertising, as 
commercial speech, was protected under the freedom of expression provision of the Canadian 
Charter. However, it held that the legislation in question could be saved under section 1 of the 
Charter if the Government proved that the limitations on the rights were demonstrably 
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justifiable as reasonable restrictions in a free and democratic society. Under section 1, the 
Government was required to show that the objective of the law related to a pressing and 
substantial objective, and that the means chosen to achieve that objective were proportionate 
to the objectives pursued. This required that the measures chosen were rationally connected to 
the objective and minimally impaired the guaranteed right. The judgment of the majority 
upheld the legislation primarily on a 'manipulation' thesis. The concern addressed was ‗the 
protection of a group which is particularly vulnerable to the techniques of seduction and 
manipulation abundant in advertising‘, which ‗accords with a general goal of consumer 
protection legislation or, in other words, to protect a group that is most vulnerable to 
commercial manipulation‘. The judgment identified several issues, that is  
the particular susceptibility of young children to media manipulation, their inability to 
differentiate between reality and fiction and to grasp the persuasive intention behind the 
message, and the secondary effects of exterior influences on the family and parental 
authority.
95
  
 
In order to establish a factual basis for this concern, the Court relied on the conclusions of the 
US Federal Trade Commission in relation to television advertising aimed at children aged 
under 7 years old, issued in 1970 when a similar debate was taking place in the United 
States.
96
 However, as Iain Ramsay has observed, these findings did not in fact answer the 
question before the Court, since the US Federal Trade Commission‘s conclusions related to 
television advertising and to children aged under 7, whereas the Quebec legislation related to 
all forms of advertising and included children up to age 13. The Court cited no specific 
evidence to support these extensions.
97
 As discussed above, the issue of when children are 
able to ‗argue against‘ advertising is controversial. Consequently, the majority also argued 
that the Court should show deference to a legislative decision in the area of balancing 
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competing economic and social interests where there was incomplete scientific evidence. It 
also noted that, since the ban could be rationalised as only partial—advertisers were still able 
to direct advertising to adults—the means chosen were not disproportionate to the objective to 
be achieved.
98
  
This example shows that public authorities should adduce existing evidence to justify the 
restrictions they have imposed on freedom of commercial expression. At the EU level, the 
Court of Justice should assess the evidence and decide, on its basis, whether the measure is 
necessary to protect children‘s health and not over-restrictive of the freedom of food operators 
to advertise their goods. It is only when the evidence is not conclusive that the Court should 
allow a margin of discretion to the relevant public authorities, provided that they have 
established that their intervention is reasonable.  
 
2. The US Supreme Court’s excessive reliance on the information paradigm 
 
The US Supreme Court has proved much more willing to scrutinise legislative restrictions on 
advertising than the Court of Justice of the EU when public health considerations are invoked. 
Its approach finds two interesting illustrations in the 44 Liquormart
99
 and  Lorillard
100
 cases, 
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 This does not address the problems associated with the exposure of children to food marketing during 
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 44 Liquormart v Rhode Island (1996) 517 US 484. In this case, the US Supreme Court invalidated a total ban 
on advertisements providing information about the prices of alcoholic drinks. As part of its assessment, the Court 
clearly stated that advertising bans amounted to the manipulation of consumer choices by keeping them ignorant 
(517 US 484, 522). This statement reinforces the position which the Court had adopted in its earlier decision in 
Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Consumer Council (1976) 425 US 748, in which it had held that if the State 
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truthful information about entirely lawful activity for fear of that information‘s effect upon its disseminators and 
recipients. For a comparison of this case with Gourmet, see Biondi, above n 75. 
dealing with restrictions imposed on the advertising of tobacco products and alcoholic 
beverages respectively. In both cases, the US Supreme Court accepted that the State had a 
substantial interest in protecting public health. It therefore focused its reasoning on the third 
and fourth limbs of the Central Hudson test (section III.A. above). It concluded that the states 
concerned in these cases had failed to establish that there was a ‗reasonable fit‘ between the 
legislative ends and the means chosen to reach those ends. To reach this conclusion, the Court 
reviewed the measures imposed by the states, insisting that the burden lay on them to 
establish that the restrictions were both necessary and proportionate stricto sensu. In so doing, 
the US Supreme Court did not hesitate to engage in the balancing exercise proportionality 
required and to challenge, if necessary, the assumptions on which the measures at stake were 
based.  
In 44 Liquormart, more specifically, the US Supreme Court cited at length its previous 
ruling in Victoria Board of Pharmacy, noting that blanket advertising bans should not be 
approved unless the speech itself was flawed in some way, either because it was deceptive or 
because it related to unlawful activity. On this basis, it reviewed Rhode Island‘s legislation 
and unanimously concluded that ‗because Rhode Island [had] failed to carry its heavy burden 
of justifying its complete ban on price advertising, that ban [was] invalid‘. First, the Court 
held that the state had not shown how its legitimate objective of moderating alcohol 
consumption would be significantly advanced by the introduction of a price advertising ban 
(third part of the Central Hudson test: necessity). Secondly, the Court ruled that the state 
could have taken other measures which would have been less restrictive of commercial 
speech, including the imposition of higher prices through taxation or the adoption of 
educational measures intended to draw attention to the dangers of excessive drinking (fourth 
part of the Central Hudson test: proportionality stricto sensu).  
The reasoning of the US Supreme Court relies on the strong premise that advertising 
informs. It could nonetheless be argued that the informational value of advertising is quite 
limited. Advertising is above all intended to persuade. As part of its commercial strategy a 
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 Lorillard Tobacco Co et al v Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al (2001) 533 US 525. In this case, 
the question arose of the compatibility with the First Amendment of the regulations introduced by the state of 
Massachusetts restricting tobacco advertising and sales practices intended to recruit children as new 
customers. In particular, the regulations restricted outdoor advertising, point of sale advertising and certain sale 
practices (retail sales transactions, mail transactions).  
commercial operator will insist only on the positive aspects of the goods or the services it 
offers. Advertising is one-sided, and the requirements highlighted above to disclose certain 
information to consumers cannot compensate for this fact. For example, claiming that certain 
breakfast cereals are low in fat suggests that they are healthier than they really are, as they 
may contain some 40 per cent of added sugars. Moreover, in many cases, the commercial 
operator will appeal to the feelings of consumers rather than their rational abilities to think 
critically: a beautiful woman enjoying a glass of wine, a sporty man driving a powerful car, 
happy children eating a bar of chocolate and so on. In these cases, the information value of 
advertising is very low indeed, even though this marketing technique may nonetheless prove 
very effective to induce consumption.  
This issue is particularly important when marketing techniques target groups of 
particularly vulnerable consumers, such as children. The use of sports celebrities or character 
merchandising raises particular concerns in marketing campaigns directed at children for 
goods or services which are deemed ‗harmful‘. If we return to the example of food marketing, 
eight-time Beijing Games Gold Medallist Michael Phelps signed a deal with Kellogg‘s to 
promote sugary breakfast cereals, and another one with McDonald‘s to serve as an 
ambassador actively recruiting Chinese children to become McDonald‘s customers.101 
Similarly, character merchandising plays on children‘s fascination with a fantasy character, so 
as to induce them to buy, or to insist that their parents buy, the advertised good or service. The 
problem with this advertising technique is that the use of cartoon characters is in no way 
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 See the McDonald‘s interview of the champion on 18 August 2008 after he had won eight gold medals, in 
which he stated that his favourite food was a double cheeseburger and fries, available at 
<www.youtube.com/watch?gl=FR&v=pCWpkB45je0>, accessed 12 July 2010. 
related to the actual content of the food.
102
 It is therefore arguable that such marketing 
techniques rely on an exploitation of children‘s inexperience and credulity, by presenting a 
(generally unhealthy) foodstuff by referring to their familiar environment. Consequently, 
several authors have argued that such techniques, and food marketing to children more 
generally, are inherently misleading, due to the limited cognitive abilities of children to grasp 
the full commercial purpose of advertising.
103
 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of information provision in improving lifestyles largely 
relies on a motivated and educated public perfectly able to make rational, healthy choices. 
This is, however, misconceived (at least in part), even for adults. For example, the addictive 
substances present in cigarettes make it extremely difficult for the already-addicted smoker to 
quit smoking. Information is necessary as part of a comprehensive tobacco strategy, but it is 
unlikely to address the problems already-addicted smokers encounter.
104
 Courts in the US 
have themselves cited the addictiveness of nicotine as a reason why smokers may not be 
found to have behaved unreasonably in continuing to smoke after they have become aware of 
the health risks smoking poses.
105
 Similarly, in relation to dietary choices, the reviews carried 
out to assess the role of information in behaviour change have concluded that information and 
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education can contribute towards such change
106
; however, information alone is unlikely to 
lead to change unless it can overcome counteracting psychological, behavioural, economic 
and environmental barriers. Achieving behaviour change is far from straightforward. Tackling 
obesity involves a variety of short- and longer-term goals, including what may be challenging 
alterations to diet, changes in how the retail sector influences shopping behaviour, increases in 
the amount of exercise engaged in, different choices of transport, and so on. Research shows 
that people and their environment interact to determine behaviour and the potential for 
behaviour change. There is also evidence that there are difficulties in making healthy choices 
in some environments more than in others. These studies illustrate the considerable 
psychological effort needed to combat the temptations of an unhealthy lifestyle, and how 
freedom of choice can sometimes, counter-intuitively, make it more difficult to resist 
temptation.
107
 Moreover, a key feature of behaviours that promote public health is that they 
will deliver gains for the individual and for the population only if they are maintained in the 
long term.
108
  
These research findings should lead societies to question their frequent portrayal of 
obesity as an issue of personal willpower. It is often assumed that individuals are getting fat 
because they keep eating too much and fail to engage in enough physical activity. Obesity is a 
much more complex phenomenon than this simplistic approach suggests. The role of genes 
and the role of societal and environmental factors over which individuals have little control 
support the view that obesity is not exclusively a question of personal responsibility. 
Responsibility is shared between, one the one hand, individuals, who must adopt an adequate 
lifestyle to protect their health and that of their children, and, on the other hand, policy-
makers and society, who must create environments that better suit human biology and support 
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individuals in developing and sustaining healthy lifestyles, bearing in mind that the vast 
majority of the population is predisposed to gaining weight.
109
  
It has therefore become widely acknowledged that the responsibility for healthy diets 
cannot rest exclusively on individuals. Public authorities and other stakeholders must 
facilitate their choices by creating an environment where healthy choices become easier 
choices.
110
 The anti-paternalism argument invoked by the US Supreme Court in a range of its 
decisions reviewing the compatibility of advertising restrictions with the First Amendment to 
the Constitution should therefore be tempered. Toxic environments may indeed require State 
intervention to help consumers protect themselves. This is all the more justified in light of the 
heavy burden associated with most chronic diseases resulting from unhealthy lifestyles.
111
  
Lastly, the reasoning of the US Supreme Court may also be criticised for the cavalier use 
it has made of existing evidence. It has tended to rule that less restrictive measures would 
ensure a higher level of public health protection while being more respectful of commercial 
speech than advertising restrictions. It is true that pricing and education measures have the 
potential to curb smoking and reduce the disease-burden associated with it. Nevertheless, as 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control has explicitly stated, smoking is triggered by 
a range of factors, and  
strong political commitment is necessary to develop and support, at the national, regional and 
international levels, comprehensive multisectorial measures and coordinated responses.
112
 
                                                 
109
 D King, Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government and Head of the Government Office for Science, 
ibid, Foreword. See also K Brownell, R Kersh, D Ludwig, R Post, R Puhl, M Schwartz and W Willett, ‗Personal 
Responsibility and Obesity: A Constructive Approach to a Controversial Issue‘ (2010) 29 Health Affairs 378. 
110
 At EU level, see in particular the Commission‘s White Paper laying down a strategy for Europe on nutrition, 
overweight, and obesity related health issues, COM(2007) 279 final. In the US, the idea that the Government 
should support healthy choices is slowly gaining ground: see White House Task Force on Childhood Obesity, 
Solving the Problem of Childhood Obesity within a Generation, Report to the President, 11 May 2010, 
<www.letsmove.gov/tfco_fullreport_may2010.pdf>.  
111
 Eg, the costs attributed to overweight and obesity throughout the 25 EU Member States (without Bulgaria and 
Romania) have been estimated at €81 billion—an amount which is bound to increase given rising obesity trends: 
Impact Assessment Accompanying the Obesity Prevention White Paper of 30 May 2007, SEC(2007) 706/2, 34. 
In the US, medical spending on adults that was attributed to obesity amounted to approximately $147 billion in 
2008: White House Task Force on Childhood Obesity, above n 110, 3. 
112
 Art 4(2). 
Comment [M19]:  Please confirm the 
full point at the end of this extract. 
 Consequently, only multi-sectoral tobacco strategies, which should comprise, inter alia, 
comprehensive marketing bans on tobacco products, are likely to be effective. One type of 
measure should not exclude another; quite the contrary, one measure should reinforce the 
effectiveness of another. The US Supreme Court should not substitute its assessment for that 
of the legislature. It is too categorical to rule that ‗speech prohibitions of this type [advertising 
bans] rarely survive constitutional review‘113: the complexity of the problems modern 
societies have to face to ensure a high level of public health protection should be 
acknowledged rather than sacrificed on the basis of a flawed argument resting exclusively on 
the information paradigm as key to liberal market economies.  
The comparison of the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU with the case law of 
the US Supreme Court highlights the very different stances that these two constitutional 
courts have adopted in relation to restrictions on commercial speech imposed for public health 
reasons. The former is very reluctant to exercise its review powers, and has failed to require 
that public authorities intending to curtail the freedom of commercial operators to advertise 
their goods and services effectively discharge the burden of proving that their restrictive 
measures are necessary to protect public health and do not have any suitable, less restrictive 
alternatives. By contrast, the US Supreme Court has made it excessively difficult for public 
authorities to impose any meaningful advertising restrictions, on the ground that truthful 
information on which consumers are likely to rely to decide what they should buy should not 
be suppressed. A more balanced approach is required which combines the skill of the US 
Supreme Court in ensuring that public authorities discharge the burden of proving that 
restrictions to commercial speech are proportionate, with the caution of the Court of Justice in 
ensuring that it does not substitute its assessment for that of the legislature.
114
 It is only then 
that the discourse of both public authorities and commercial operators will be accurately 
scrutinised, consumer choices effectively supported and public health adequately protected.   
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